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IN DEFENSE OF EXPERIMENTATION WITH
AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE
Carl Tobias•
It would be presumptuous of me to criticize either view articulat-

ed, and even worse form to choose sides, in the recent dispute over
the merits of automatic disclosure that graced the pages of this
journal.1 Federal civil procedure cognoscenti need no introduction
to these highly respected participants in, and students of, the
federal courts. Former Judge Griffin B. Bell rendered distinguished service on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit before President Jimmy Carter appointed him Attorney
General. Senior Judge William W Schwarzer compiled an excellent
record of service as a judge of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California and was a prolific, frequently
cited writer on federal civil procedure before he assumed the post
of Director of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC).2
Only an author more foolish than I, therefore, would take on
either of these federal court giants. Fortunately for me, several
factors make that unnecessary. First, there is considerable merit
to what Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer propose, and both have
thoroughly and carefully enunciated the cases for their respective
positions on the merits of various proposals for automatic disclosure. Second, it is virtually impossible to ascertain which judge is
correct due to the paucity of relevant empirical information that is
currently available. Indeed, it may well be that each is right and

*Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the
Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1
See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclcsure in Discovery-TN! Rush to Reform, 27
GA. L. REv. 1 (1993); William W Schwarzer, Jn Defense of'"Automalic Disclosure in Discouery", 27 GA. L. REv. 655 (1993). For purposes of convenience, I refer to Judge Bell as the
author of the first article; this is not meant to accord less credit to the other able authors of
the article, Chilton Davis Varner and Hugh Q. Gottschalk.
2
See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Rule II Reuisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1988);
William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under tN! New Federal Rule II-A ClOSt!r Look, 104 F .R.D.
181 (1985). He has remained an active writer. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 1; William
W Schwarzer, Slaying tN! Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be More Effective
Than. Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178 (1991).
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both are wrong in some measure.
All of these considerations indicate that discretion is the better
part of valor. The preferable approach, accordingly, is to mediate
this controversy by applying a substantial dose of that much-touted
tonic, alternative dispute resolution. My purpose is to discover a
pragmatic, feasible solution to the difficulties posed by the proposal
for automatic disclosure which the United States Supreme Court
transmitted to Congress on April 22, 19933 and to the disagreement over that proposal between Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer.
I find that remedy in the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990,4
which affords an extremely effective vehicle for treating this
dispute.
I. THE DISPUTE

Brief examination of the dispute over the automatic disclosure
proposal is warranted. Many federal court observers across a broad
political spectrum, including parties, lawyers, and judges who
participate in federal civil litigation, agree that numerous problems
attend modem discovery, namely excessive discovery, abusive
discovery, and expense and delay.5 There appears to be equally
widespread opposition to the automatic disclosure proposal among

3
See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE AND FORMS, H.R. Doc. 74, 103d Cong., let
Sees. (1993) (on file with the Georgia Law Review) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT TRANS·

MI'ITAL].
4
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1993)). Others have advocated similar general
approaches. Critics of the first automatic disclosure proposal developed by the Advisory
Committee suggested limited experimentation. See Bell, supra note 1, at 31·32; see also infra
note 23 and accompanying text (discussing automatic disclosure procedures recommended
by 1991 Advisory Committee). Judge Bell makes an analogous recommendation. See Bell,
supra note 1, at,53-57. Indeed, the Advisory Committee subscribed to such an' approach for
a brief time. See id. at 34-35. I elaborate these general approaches in an effort to afford
Congress specific, concrete guidance for implementation and for treating the automatic
disclosure proposal.
5
See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Litigation:
Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579; Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery
Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263 (1992); Committee on Discovery, New York Bar Association,
Report on Discovery Under Rule 26(bXl), in 127 F.R.D. 625 (1990).
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similarly diverse participants in federal civil litigation.6 Judge
Bell articulates five principal ideas to support his contention that
the disclosure proposal is flawed,7 while Judge Schwarzer evaluates those propositions and emphasizes significant features of the
proposal which he believes are relevant to its adoption.8
Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissenting statement opposing
transmittal of the -disclosure proposal, subscribed to many ideas
offered by Judge Bell.9 Justice Scalia observed that the new
regime would "perhaps worst of all, introduce into the trial process
an element that is contrary to the nature of our adversary system."10 He found it "most imprudent to embrace such a radical
alteration that [had not received] any significant testing on a local
level."11 Justice Scalia added that Judge Schwarzer himself had
recognized the need for analogous experimentation prior to the
promulgation of a national requirement when Judge Schwarzer
advocated a considerably more extreme disclosure proposal four
years ago. 12
Justice Scalia considered it more important that Congress
similarly had found such local experimentation with disclosure to
be essential "before major revision"13 and had created an experimental program for federal trial courts under the Civil Justice

6
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 1, at 28-32 and sources cited therein; Thomas M. Mangler,
Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F .R.D.
155 (1991); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991).
1
See Bell, supra note 1, at 5, 41-46. For example, Judge Bell suggests that the proposal's
vagueness will increase motion practice and foster overproduction while automatic disclosure
will increase expense. Id.
8
Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 655-64.
9
See SUPREME COURTTRANsMl'ITAL, supra note 3, at 107-09 (Scalin, J., dissenting) (citing
Bell et al., supra note 1). For instance, Justice Scalia contends that the proposal will
increase motion practice and expense. Id. at 107 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note
7 (discussing similar criticism by Judge Bell).
10
SUPREME COURT TRANsMl'ITAL, supra note 3, at 104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11
Id. at 108.
12
Id. (citing William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and
Discovery Reform, 50 U. Pl'IT. L. REv. 703, 723 (1989) (suggesting adoption of his disclosure
proposal only after successful "trial period•)); see also Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295,
1361 (1978) (similar recognition by another advocate of discovery reform and participant in
development or current disclosure proposal).
13
SUPREME COURT TRANSMI'ITAL, supra note 3, at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Reform Act (CJRA). 14 The statute prescribes experimentation
with some form of cooperative discovery for not less than three
years in many of the ninety-four districts and mandates that the
Judicial Conference of the United States prepare a report and
recommendations on certain of these efforts for Congress by
1995.15 This experimentation is the linchpin for reconciling the
differences between Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer. It concomitantly enables Congress to treat effectively the national automatic
disclosure proposal that the Court forwarded, thereby averting a
potential collision between that proposal and local experimentation
under the CJRA. 16
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Congress may follow numerous courses of action. It could simply
allow the controversial national automatic discovery proposal to
become effective in December 1993 by inaction. 17 For reasons
enumerated above, this manner of proceeding is inadvisable. 18
Preferably, Congress might also attempt to resolve the controversy
over the efficacy of the automatic disclosure proposal that it is
currently considering.
Congress could collect, analyze, and synthesize information on
experimentation with automatic disclosure in the approximately
twenty-five Early Implementation District Courts (EIDCs) that
have instituted the procedure. 19 The Federal Judicial Center, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), or the
14

Id. (citing Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 104-105, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1993))); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp.
1993) (providing guidance to district courts for formulation of experimental programs).
15
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5089, 5097-98.
18
The collision will be between the national disclosure rule and the inconsistent local
rules adopted in the federal districts. See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Ciuil
Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 139 (1993).
17
See SUPREME COURT TRANSMITI'AL, supra note 3, at l; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (Supp.
1993) ("Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule
is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law. n).
18
See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (highlighting some criticisms of quick
adoption of proposal).
19
See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CML JUSTICE REFORM ACT
REPORT, Exhibit D (June 1, 1992) (providing profiles of districts experimenting with
automatic disclosure).
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EIDCs themselves may have some relevant material. Correspondingly, Congress could schedule hearings to elicit testimony on the
efficacy of automatic disclosure in the EID Cs and on the automatic
discovery proposal that is now before it.20
The prospects for the success of these efforts are rather limited,
however. For example, many EIDCs have had less than eighteen
months in which to experiment with and evaluate automatic
disclosure, most districts have relied on a procedure different from
the one transmitted by the Supreme Court, some apparently did
not create baselines against which to measure that technique's
effects, and few districts seem to have undertaken rigorous efforts
to gather, assess, and synthesize information on the mechanism's
efficacy.
The preferable approach is for Congress to suspend the effective
date of the automatic disclosure proposal presently under consideration and to suspend debate temporarily over the efficacy of that
proposal and other disclosure procedures. Congress, in consultation
with the FJC, AO, EIDCs, or others possessing relevant expertise,
such Judge Bell, Judge Schwarzer, and Magistrate Judge Wayne
Brazil, and federal court litigators, such as Bob Gibbins, Greg
Joseph, Laura Kaster, and Loren Kieve,21 should then identify a
small number of automatic disclosure procedures that apparently
have the greatest promise. Congress could prescribe experimentation with various forms of automatic disclosure for three to five
years22 in fewer than all ninety-four federal districts.

as

20
Congress might also explore the efficacy of the national rule revision procedures that
it instituted in the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act and the poU!ntio.1 inconsistency between
the Federal Rules and local rules adopted to implement the c.JRA. These topics are beyond
the scope of this piece, however. For a discussion of these topics, see Carl Tobias, Ciuil
Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Ciuil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393
(1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization] (analyzing the progressive bo.lknnimtion of federal
civil procedure, especially in the passage of the c.JRA, and its detrimental implications for
federal judges, lawyers, and litigants); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Ciuil Justice Reform
Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Recalibrating] (examining requirements ofc.JRA and its implementation in EIDCs and offering suggestioOB to a-0lve problems
with early reform efforts).
21
This list obviously is not intended to be comprehensive.
22
My choice of this specific time frame is tailored to that prescribed in the c.JRA. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text; cf. JUDICrAL CONFE~CE OF THE UmTED STATES
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELn.UNARY' DRAFT OF PROPOSED
.AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF
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This approach actually would be less complicated and more costeffective than it might appear, because the structure for experimentation already exists in the Civil Justice Reform Act and its
implementation. For instance, nearly all of the EIDCs presently
imposing automatic disclosure premised their procedures on a 1991
Advisory Committee draft requiring disclosure of information that
"bears significantly on any claim or defense."23 In April 1992, the
Committee replaced this stricture with the requirement that
litigants disclose "discoverable information relevant to disputed
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."24
The EIDCs experimenting with the language in the first draft
should continue to do so, while a somewhat smaller number of
districts currently completing their civil justice expense and delay
reduction plans probably should experiment with the second draft
(the proposal now before Congress), unless either formulation
appears to be unworkable. 25 A few districts might experiment
with the "meet and confer" procedure proposed by Judge Bell. 26
They also could experiment with other possibilities which are
limited only by the creativity of the federal judiciary, the CJRA
advisory groups, the FJC, the AO, and other informed experts, such
as Judge Schwarzer; by the feasibility of the various proposals that
are developed; and by the manageability of the overall effort.27 In
short, Congress should support broad experimentation but be
attuned to the possibility that the project might become unwieldy
or that federal civil procedure may experience too much additional

EvlDENCE, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) {containing draft of withdrawn proposal
that prescribed experimentation with inconsistent local rules for not greater than five years).
23
ld. {Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 26{a)), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 87-88; see also supra
note 19 and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 16, at 140-41.
24
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CML
PRocEDURE 26 {May 1992). See generally Winter, supra note 5.
25
I assume that both formulations satisfy this standard. Most EIDCs have apparently
encountered little difficulty implementing the initial draft;. Respected observers, including
Judge Schwarzer and Judge Winter, believe that the second draft is workable.
28
See Bell, supra note 1, at 49-53.
ZT If too many districts experiment with too many disclosure procedures, the effort could
become impossible to administer. Congress, therefore, should desigriate a small number of
procedures that seem most promising.
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balkanization.28
Once Congress has designated the appropriate forms of automatic
disclosure for experimentation in the proper number of federal
districts, it must ensure that these efforts are correctly assessed.
Congress should mandate that independent, expert evaluators
establish baselines and measure the efficacy of different disclosure
procedures over a sufficient period to afford a reliable sense of each
procedure?s relative effectiveness. When that information has been
assembled, analyzed, and synthesized, the rule revisors and
Congress should be able to ascertain which disclosure mechanisms
are most efficacious in specific contexts and to prescribe them as
indicated.29 If one procedure seems vastly superior and appears
applicable across a broad range of circumstances, its embodiment
in a national rule ~ay be warranted.30

III.

CONCLUSION

Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer have contributed significantly
to the national debate that is currently raging over automatic
disclosure. Congress should address this controversy by drawing
upon the civil justice reform effort that it instituted under the 1990
statute. Appropriately measured experimentation should help to
identify those automatic disclosure procedures that will prove most
efficacious.

28

See generally Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 20; Tobias, Recalibrating, supra note
.
29
See Tobias, Recalibrating, supra note 20, at 128-32 (similarly suggesting broader
implementation of c.JRA).
30
See Tobias, Recalibrating, supra note 20, at 130 n.75; Tobias, supra note 16, at 147.
See generally Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Ruka and the Tension With
Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REY. 853 (1989).
20.

